Abstract. We introduce a cryptographic primitive named threshold trapdoor function (TTDF), from which we give generic constructions of threshold and revocation encryptions under adaptive corruption model. Then, we show TTDF can be instantiated under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. By combining the instantiations of TTDF with the generic constructions, we obtain threshold and revocation encryptions which compare favorably over existing schemes. The experimental results show that our proposed schemes are practical.
Introduction
Threshold public-key encryption. TPKE [1, 2, 3, 4] can distribute the decryption power among many servers in order to ensure threshold servers can decrypt ciphertexts, while any probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) adversary corrupting less than threshold servers is unable to obtain the message. TPKE itself provides useful functionalities, and it is also an important building block for other cryptographic primitives, such as mix-net (anonymous channel) [5] , public key encryption with non-interactive opening [6, 7] .
Designing generic construction of TPKE has proved to be a highly non-trivial task. Dodis and Katz [8] gave a generic construction of TPKE from multiple encryption technique. Wee [9] introduced a new primitive called threshold extractable hash proofs and presented a generic construction of TPKE from it. However, both of above constructions are only secure under the static corruption model where the adversary fixes the servers that will be corrupted before the scheme is set up. Following the work of Wee [9] , Libert and Yung [10] introduced a primitive named all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof systems, from which they gave a generic construction of TPKE under adaptive corruption model where the adversary can corrupt servers at any time. The results are important since it is known that the adaptive adversary is strictly stronger than the static one [11, 12] . But they only showed concrete instantiations under number-theoretic assumptions in bilinear groups which are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Recently, lattices have been recognized as a viable foundation for quantum-resistant cryptography. Bendlin and Damgård [13] gave the first lattice-based TPKE based on a variant of Regev's scheme [14] . Xie et al. [15] designed the first chosen-ciphertext secure (IND-CCA) TPKE under the LWE assumption. However, both of above TPKEs are only statically secure, and the size of the public key and the ciphertext is at least linear in the number of servers. Bendlin et al. [16] converted Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [17] into threshold one, which can be transformed into a TPKE via the generic transformation in [18] . However, in an offline phase, their scheme needs the parties to perform lots of interactive precomputation. In summary, the state-of-the-art TPKE is not entirely satisfactory. On one hand, existing generic constructions of TPKE are designed in the limited static corruption model which fails to capture realistic attacks. On the other hand, most existing TPKE schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions which are insecure against quantum attacks.
Revocation public-key encryption. RPKE [19, 20, 9] enables a sender to broadcast ciphertexts and all but some revoked users can do the decryption. It is a special kind of broadcast encryption [21] which enables a sender to encrypt messages and transmit ciphertexts to users on a broadcast channel in order to the chosen users can decrypt ciphertexts. RPKE has numerous applications, including pay-TV systems, streaming audio/video and many others.
Naor and Pinkas [19] considered the following scenario: a group controller (GC) controls the decryption capabilities of users. If a subgroup of users is disallowed to do the decryption, the GC needs to generate a new key which should be known to other users and be used to encrypt in the further group communication. Then they constructed a RPKE scheme under the DDH assumption. Unlike the scenario of [19] , Dodis and Fazio [20] designed a RPKE in which every user who knows the revoked identities can encrypt messages and every non-revoked user can decrypt ciphertexts. Then, they constructed IND-CCA RPKE under the DDH assumption. Wee [9] presented a generic construction of RPKE in static corruption model and instantiated the construction under the DDH assumption and factoring assumption respectively. However, all of aforementioned schemes are designed under the number-theoretic assumptions which are insecure against quantum attack.
Motivations
A central goal in cryptography is to construct cryptosystems in strong security models which can resist lots of possible attacks. Another goal is to build cryptosystems under intractability assumptions which are as general as possible; in this way, we can replace the underlying assumption, if some assumption is vulnerable to a new attack or if another yields better performance. Therefore, generic constructions of TPKE and RPKE in stronger adaptive corruption model are advantageous. Meanwhile, with the development of quantum computer, designing the quantum-resistant TPKE and RPKE is also necessary. Last but not least, constructing cryptosystems based on the same cryptographic primitive brings additional advantages such as reducing the footprint of cryptographic code and easily embedding into systems.
Motivated by above discussions, we ask the following challenging questions:
Can we construct TPKE and RPKE under adaptive corruption model from one cryptographic primitive? Can we instantiate this primitive based on quantum-resistant assumptions?
Our Contributions
We introduce a cryptographic primitive named TTDF, and derive generic constructions of TPKE and RPKE under adaptive corruption model from it. Along the way to instantiate TTDF, we propose a notion called threshold lossy trapdoor function (TLTDF) and prove that TTDF is implied by TLTDF, while the latter can be instantiated based on the DDH assumption and the LWE assumption. Moreover, we show a relaxation of TTDF called threshold trapdoor relation (TTDR), which enables the same applications of TPKE and RPKE, and admits more efficient instantiation based on the DDH assumption. An overview of the contructions of this work is given in Figure 1 . Threshold Trapdoor Function. Informally, (t, n)-TTDF is a threshold version of trapdoor function. It is parameterized by the threshold value t and the number of identities n. (t, n)-TTDF splits the master trapdoor into n shared trapdoors which can be transmited to n users securely. Every user who holds shared trapdoor can compute a piece of inversion share. Then, by collecting more than t inversion shares, the combiner can recover the preimage. Especially, it can even compute any other inversion shares (threshold shares mean all shares). We formalize security notion for TTDF, namely threshold one-wayness, which requires that the function is hard to invert, even if the adversary can adaptively obtain less than t shared trapdoors.
TPKE from TTDF. (t, n)-TTDF gives rise to a simple construction of (t, n)-TPKE. The public key consists of an injective trapdoor function index ek, and the master secret key consists of the master trapdoor mtd. The sharing algorithm splits the master secret key into n shared secret keys. Given a message m, the encryption algorithm chooses a random input x and outputs the ciphertext (F(ek, x), m ⊕ hc(x)), where hc is a hardcore function. The decryption algorithm uses the shared secret key to compute a decryption share. The combining algorithm retrieves x upon receiving at least t decryption shares, and then extracts the message m. Moreover, threshold one-wayness prevents any PPT adversary who can adaptively obtain less than t shared secret keys from decrypting ciphertext.
RPKE from TTDF. (t, n)-TTDF also gives rise to a simple construction of (t − 1, n)-RPKE. The public key consists of an injective trapdoor function index ek, and the master secret key consists of the master trapdoor mtd. The sharing algorithm splits the master secret key into n shared secret keys. To encrypt a session key s, the encryption algorithm chooses a random input x and computes c 1 = F(ek, x),
The decryption algorithm takes in any non-revoked secret key and computes δ ij = F −1 (sk ij , c 1 ), j = 1, · · · , t − 1 to retrieve x, and then extracts the session key s. Moreover, threshold one-wayness ensures that no PPT adversary can decrypt ciphertext without the non-revoked secret key.
Instantiation. Along the way to instantiate TTDF, we introduce the notion of TLTDF, which is a threshold version of the lossy trapdoor function (LTDF) [22] . Informally, the LTDF has two modes. In the injective mode, it is an injective trapdoor function. In the lossy mode, it statistically loses a significant amount of information about its input. The two modes are computationally indistinguishable. However, in both modes of TLTDF, the master trapdoor can be split into many shared trapdoors and every shared trapdoor can be used to compute an inversion share. Especially, in the injective mode any threshold inversion shares can be used to recover preimage. Moreover, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish both modes, even if the adversary can adaptively obtain less than threshold shared trapdoors.
We prove that TTDF is implied by TLTDF, while the latter can be instantiated under the DDH assumption and the LWE assumption respectively. DDH-based TLTDF is easy to design, while building LWE-based TLTDF is a non-trivial task. Intuitively, we transform the inversion algorithm of LTDF into threshold version by using (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme [23] . Every user gets a shared trapdoor td i , i ∈ [n], and computes the inversion share a, td i + e i . Then the combiner obtains t inversion shares to compute the Lagrangian coefficients L i for any identity set of size t and recombines the a, td by computing
Unfortunately, choosing identities in a large identity space causes the norm of errors out of control and prevents correct inversion. To resolve this problem, we take advantage of the technique of "clearing out the denominator" [24, 25, 26] . Note that since the Lagrangian coefficients are rational numbers and the identity is chosen in [n], we can scale them to be integers by computing (n!) 2 L i . By instantiating appropriate parameters, we prove that the quantity of errors preserves bounded, which does not affect the correctness of inversion.
Optimization. We show a relaxation of TTDF called TTDR. Informally, TTDR replaces the evaluation algorithm of TTDF with a relation sampling algorithm which can generate a random input with its image of a function, while the function need not be efficiently computable. We also formalize security notion for TTDR, namely threshold one-wayness, which requires that the function is hard to invert, even if the adversary can adaptively obtain less than threshold shared trapdoors.
Similar to instantiating TTDF from TLTDF, we instantiate TTDR by introducing the notion of threshold lossy trapdoor relation (TLTDR), which is a threshold version of lossy trapdoor relation (LTDR) 3 [27] . We prove TTDR is naturally implied by TLTDR. Moreover, we instantiate TLTDR based on the DDH assumption to obtain an instantiation of TTDR, which is more efficient than TTDF.
Preliminaries

Notations
We denote the natural numbers by N, the integers by Z, the real numbers by R. We use lower-case bold letters and upper-case bold letters to denote vectors and matrices (e.g. x and X). Let x T and X T denote transpositions of vector x and matrix X. For n ∈ N, 1 n denotes the string of n ones, and [n] denotes the set {1, · · · , n}. We use standard asymptotic (O, o, Ω, ω) notation to denote the growth of positive functions. We denote a negligible function by negl(λ), which is an f (λ) such that f (λ) = o(λ −c ) for every fixed constant c, and we let poly(λ) denote an unspecified function f (λ) = O(λ c ) for some constant c. If S is a set then s ← S denotes the operation of sampling an element s of S uniformly at random.
Let X and Y be two random variables over some countable set S. The statistical distance between X and Y is defined as
Assumptions
DDH Assumption. The generation algorithm Gen takes in a security parameter 1 λ and outputs (p, G, g), where p is a prime, G is a cyclic group of order p and g is a generator of G.
The DDH assumption [28] is that the ensemble The LWE assumption is that independent samples from the LWE distribution A z,χ for some secret z ∈ Z d q , and independent samples from the uniform distribution on Z d q × Z q are computationally indistinguishable. For normal error distributions, the LWE problem is as hard as the worst-case lattice problem [14] .
Randomness Extraction
We use the notion of average min-entropy [29] , that captures the remaining unpredictability of X conditioned on the value of Y :
We review the following useful lemmas from [29] .
Lemma 1. If Y takes at most 2 r values and Z is any random variable, then
Lemma 2. Let X, Y be random variables such that X ∈ {0, 1} l and H ∞ (X|Y ) ≥ k. Let H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1} l to {0, 1}
Threshold Secret Sharing
We now recall the threshold secret sharing scheme [23] . Let F be a finite field, |F| > n. Let id i ∈ F, i = 1, · · · , n be distinct, nonzero elements that are fixed and publicly known. The scheme works as follows:
• Share(s, id i ) → s i : On input a secret s ∈ F, and any identity id i , i ∈ [n]. It chooses a 1 , · · · , a t−1 ∈ F, and defines the polynomial p(x) = s +
. This is a uniform degree-(t − 1) polynomial with constant term s. The share of user id i is s i = p(id i ) ∈ F.
• Combine((id i1 , s i1 ), · · · , (id it , s it )) → s: On input any t identities id ij , j = 1, · · · , t, and associated shares s ij , j = 1, · · · , t. Using polynomial interpolation, it computes the unique degree-(t − 1) polynomial p ′ for which p ′ (id ij ) = s ij , j = 1, · · · , t. The combining algorithm outputs the secret s = p ′ (0).
Correctness. It is clear that the combining algorithm works since the secret p(0) = s can be constructed from any t shares.
By the Lagrange interpolation formula, given any t points (id ij , p(id ij )), j = 1, · · · , t,
we can compute any other points (threshold points mean all points
where the secret is a special point (0, s = p(0)).
Security. The sharing algorithm Share has perfect privacy, that is, any t − 1 users learn nothing of secret s from their shares. For any t − 1 users corresponding to identities id ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 and for any secret s (namely, p(0)), the distributions of t − 1 shares of s are perfectly indistinguishable from t − 1 independently uniform distributions. In this paper, when building TLTDF from the LWE assumption, we take advantage of the technique of "clearing out the denominator" [24, 25, 26] and the fact that the term (n!) 2 · L j is an integer, where L j , j = 1, · · · , t are the Lagrangian coefficients.
Lemma 3. ([26], Lemma 2.2). For any t identities id
ij = i j , i j ∈ [n], j = 1, · · · , t, the product (n!) 2 · L j is an integer, and |(n!) 2 · L j | ≤ (n!) 3 .
Threshold Encryption
We now recall the definition of TPKE from [9] . A (t, n)-TPKE consists of four algorithms as follows:
On input the security parameter 1 λ , the key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk = (sk 1 , · · · , sk n ).
• Enc(pk, m) → c: On input the public key pk and a message m, the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(sk i , c) → δ i : On input a shared secret key sk i , i ∈ [n] and the ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm outputs a decryption share δ i .
On input any t decryption shares δ ij , j = 1, · · · , t and the ciphertext c, the combining algorithm outputs the message m.
Correctness. For any message m, c ← Enc(pk, m), and any t decryption shares
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against IND-CPA security of TPKE scheme with adaptive corruption. Its advantage function is defined as
Here, Dec(·, Enc(pk)) denotes an oracle that given an input of any identity id, computes a fresh ciphertext c using Enc(pk) and returns a decryption share Dec(sk id , c). This captures that the adversary may obtain decryption shares of fresh encryptions of known messages. The (t, n)-TPKE scheme is IND-CPA secure, if for all PPT adversary the advantage function is negligible.
Revocation Encryption
We recall the definition of RPKE from [19] . A (r, n)-RPKE consists of four algorithms as follows:
• Gen(1 λ , t) → (pk, msk): On input the security parameter 1 λ , and the revocation threshold r, the key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a master secret key msk.
• Reg(msk, id i ) → sk i : On input the master secret key msk and a new identity id associated with the user, the registration algorithm outputs the shared secret key sk i .
• Enc(pk, S, s) → c: On input the public key pk, a set S 4 of revoked users (with |S| ≤ r) and a session key s, the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(sk i , c) → s: On input a shared secret key sk i of user id i and the ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm outputs the session key s, if id i is a legitimate user when c is constructed.
, any s, and any set S, c ← Enc(pk, S, s), we require that for any non-revoked secret key sk i , s = Dec(sk i , c).
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against IND-CPA security of RPKE scheme with adaptive corruption. Its advantage function is defined as
If for all PPT adversary the advantage function is negligible, the (r, n)-RPKE scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Threshold Trapdoor Function
We give the definition and the security of TTDF as follows.
Definition 1.
A collection of (t, n)-TTDFs is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms defined as follows:
On input the security parameter 1 λ , the generation algorithm outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Share(mtd, id i ) → td i : On input the master trapdoor mtd and any identity id i , i ∈ [n], the sharing algorithm outputs the shared trapdoor td i , i ∈ [n].
• F(ek, x) → y: On input the function index ek and x ∈ {0, 1} l , the evaluation algorithm outputs y.
On input any shared trapdoor td i and the value y, the partial inversion algorithm outputs the inversion share δ i .
•
On input ek, x ∈ {0, 1} l , any t − 1 inversion shares δ i1 , · · · , δ it−1 of the image of x, and identity id it , the combining inversion algorithm outputs the inversion share δ it of identity id it .
• Combine(δ i1 , · · · , δ it , y) → x: On input any t inversion shares δ ij , j = 1, · · · , t and the value y, the combining algorithm outputs x.
Note that the generation algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm, while the rest five algorithms are deterministic algorithms, and we require that in the partial inversion algorithm and the combining algorithm, if a value y is not in the image, the behavior of the algorithms are unspecified.
, we require that for any t shared trapdoors td i1 , · · · , td it , we have
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against (t, n)-TTDF and define its advantage function as
If for any PPT adversary the advantage function is negligible, (t, n)-TTDF is threshold one-way.
Connection to Function Sharing
De Santis et al. [2] introduced the notion of function sharing (FS) parameterized by the threshold value t and the number of identities n. (t, n)-FS can split the master trapdoor into n shared trapdoors, where n is a fixed polynomial of the security parameter. The function is easy to invert when given threshold (at least t out of n) shared trapdoors, while any PPT adversary cannot invert the function even if it obtains any t− 1 shared trapdoors and a history tape H with partial inversion shares of polynomial many random images. Then they constructed threshold cryptosystems based on FS and instantiated it under the RSA assumption. However, the number of identities of their FS and TPKE is limited in a fixed polynomial of security parameter.
In this paper, we propose the notion of TTDF that differs from FS of the number of identities. In TTDF, the generation algorithm and the sharing algorithm are independent of the number of identities, and the total number of identities could be an exponential number. Therefore, (t, n)-TTDF implies (t, n)-FS. (t, n)-TTDF has an additional combining inversion algorithm that given the function index ek, any preimage x and any t − 1 inversion shares of the image of x, can compute the inversion share of any other identity. Therefore, (t, n)-TTDF can be used to construct the TPKE scheme [9] which supports ad-hoc groups (i.e., exponential number of identities and the generation algorithm is independent of the total number of identities), the reason is that the reduction algorithm who holds any t − 1 shared trapdoors can answer the oracle Dec(·, Enc(pk)) of all identities.
Threshold Encryption from TTDF
Let (Gen, Share, F, F −1 , CombineF −1 , Combine) be a (t, n)-TTDF and hc(·) be a hardcore function. We construct a TPKE as follows:
On input the security parameter 1 λ , the generation algorithm runs (ek, mtd) ← TTDF.Gen(1 λ ) and outputs a public key pk = ek and a master secret key msk = mtd.
• Share(msk, id i ) → sk i : On input the master secret key msk and any identity id i , i ∈ [n], the sharing algorithm runs td i ← TTDF.Share(msk, id i ) and outputs the shared secret key
• Enc(pk, m) → c: On input the public key pk and a message m, the encryption algorithm chooses x ← {0, 1} l , computes c 1 = TTDF.F(pk, x), c 2 = hc(x) ⊕ m, and outputs the ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ).
• Dec(sk i , c) → δ i : On input a secret key sk i and a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm computes δ i = TTDF.F −1 (sk i , c 1 ), and outputs a decryption share δ i .
• Combine(δ i1 , · · · , δ it , c) → m: On input any t decryption shares δ ij , j = 1, · · · , t and the ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ), the combining algorithm computes
It outputs the message m.
Theorem 1.
If the TTDF is threshold one-way, then the TPKE is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. We define two hybrid experiments Game 1 , Game 2 .
• Game 1 : The game is identical to the IND-CPA experiment. At the beginning, the challenger runs Gen to obtain pk and msk. The challenger sends pk to A. A chooses any t−1 identities id ij , j = 1, · · · , t−1 to corrupt. Then the challenger runs the sharing algorithm Share to obtain sk ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 and sends them to A. A can choose any message m ′ and any identity id ′ to query the oracle Dec(·, Enc(pk)) many times, and obtain the decryption share δ ′ ← Dec(sk ′ , Enc(pk, m ′ )), where sk ′ is shared secret key of identity id ′ . Upon receiving the messages m 0 , m 1 from A, the challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random and returns c * = Enc(pk, m b ) to A. A is still able to have access to the oracle Dec(·, Enc(pk)). At the end of the game, A outputs b ′ ∈ {0, 1} as the guess of b. If b ′ = b, A wins this game, otherwise fails.
1. D runs A on input pk = ek and gets identities id i1 , · · · , id it−1 output by A. 2. D chooses these identities to corrupt, and obtains associated shared trapdoors td i1 , · · · , td it−1 , then returns these shared trapdoors to A. A can choose any message m ′ and any identity id ′ to query the oracle Dec(·, Enc(pk)). D chooses x ′ in domain at random and computes c 
Therefore, the TPKE is IND-CPA secure.
Revocation Encryption from TTDF
Let (Gen, Share, F, F −1 , CombineF −1 , Combine) be a (t, n)-TTDF and hc(·) be a hardcore function. We construct a (t − 1, n)-RPKE as follows:
• Reg(msk, id i ) → sk i : On input the master secret key msk and any identity id i , i ∈ [n], the registration algorithm runs td i ← TTDF.Share(mtd, id i ) and outputs the shared secret key sk i = td i , i ∈ [n].
• Enc(pk, sk i1 , · · · , sk it−1 , s) → c: On inputs the public key pk, a set of t − 1 revoked secret keys sk ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 and a session key s, the encryption algorithm chooses x ← {0, 1} l , computes c 1 = TTDF.F(pk, x), c 2 = hc(x) ⊕ s and δ ij = TTDF.F −1 (sk ij , c 1 ), j = 1, · · · , t − 1. It outputs the ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , δ i1 , · · · , δ it−1 ).
• Dec(sk ij , c) → s: On inputs a secret key sk ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 and a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm computes δ ij = TTDF. Proof. We define two hybrid experiments Game 1 , Game 2 .
• Game 1 : The game is identical to the IND-CPA experiment. At the beginning, the challenger runs (pk, msk) ← Gen(1 λ ) and gives the pk to the adversary A, A can choose any t − 1 identities id ij , j = 1, · · · , t−1 to corrupt. The challenger runs the registration algorithm to generate sk ij , j = 1, · · · , t−1 and gives them to A. Upon receiving two session keys s 0 , s 1 from A, the challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random and returns c * = Enc(pk, sk i1 , · · · , sk it−1 , s b ) to A. At the end of the game, A outputs
l and r is either hc(x) or a random string, D works as follows:
1. D runs A on input pk = ek and gets identities output by A.
D chooses these identities to corrupt and obtains associated trapdoors, then runs A on input these associated trapdoors and obtains two session keys
′ , D returns "1" to denote r is the output of the hardcore function, otherwise returns "0" to denote r is a random string.
The distinguisher D can give a perfect simulation of either Game 1 or Game 2 . The advantage of D is non-negligible, which is a contradiction of the threshold one-wayness. Therefore, | Pr[
. Finally, in Game 2 the output of hardcore function has been replaced with a random string, so Pr[A Game 2 = b] = 1/2. We have:
Therefore, the RPKE is IND-CPA secure.
Threshold Lossy Trapdoor Function
Let l(λ) = poly(λ) denote the input length of the function, k(λ) ≤ l(λ) and r(λ) = l(λ) − k(λ) denote the lossiness and the residual leakage. We often omit the dependence on λ.
Definition 2. A collection of (t, n, l, k)-TLTDFs is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms defined as follows. For notational convenience, define the sampling algorithm Samp inj (·) :=Samp(·, 1) samples injective mode and Samp loss (·) :=Samp(·, 0) samples lossy mode.
• Samp inj (1 λ ) → (ek, mtd): On input the security parameter 1 λ , the sampling algorithm outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Samp loss (1 λ ) → (ek, mtd): On input the security parameter 1 λ , the sampling algorithm outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Share(mtd, id i ) → td i : On input the master trapdoor mtd and any identity id i , i ∈ [n], in both modes the sharing algorithm outputs the shared trapdoor td i , i ∈ [n].
• F(ek, x) → y: On input the function index ek and x ∈ {0, 1} l , in both modes the evaluation algorithm outputs y, but in the lossy mode the image has size at most 2 r = 2 l−k .
• F −1 (td i , y) → δ i : On input any shared trapdoor td i , i ∈ [n] and the value y, the partial inversion algorithm outputs an inversion share δ i .
• CombineF −1 (ek, x, δ i1 , · · · , δ it−1 , id it ) → δ it : On input ek, x ∈ {0, 1} l , any t − 1 inversion shares δ i1 , · · · , δ it−1 of the image of x, and identity id it , the combining inversion algorithm outputs the inversion share δ it of identity id it .
• Combine(δ i1 , · · · , δ it , y) → x: On input any t inversion shares δ ij , j = 1, · · · , t and the value y, in injective mode the combining algorithm outputs x.
Note that the sampling algorithms in both modes are probabilistic algorithms, while the rest five algorithms are deterministic algorithms, and we require that the shared trapdoors in both modes have the same space, and the behavior of the partial inversion algorithm and the combining algorithm is unspecified, if a value y is not in the image.
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against TLTDF and define its advantage function as
A TLTDF is said to produce indistinguishable function indexes if Adv ind TLTDF,A (λ) is negligible for all adversary.
Theorem 3. If the sharing algorithm holds perfect privacy and the injective and lossy modes of LTDF are indistinguishable, then the TLTDF described above is also hard to distinguish injective from lossy.
Proof. We define four hybrid experiments Game 1 , Game 2 , Game 3 , Game 4 .
• Game 1 : The challenger runs (ek, mtd) ← Samp inj (1 λ ), and gives ek to A. A chooses any t−1 identities id ij to corrupt. Then the challenger runs the sharing algorithm to generate t − 1 associated trapdoor td ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1. The challenger gives the t − 1 shared trapdoors to A.
• Game 2 : The game is identical to Game 1 , except that the challenger generates the corrupted trapdoors by choosing r i , i = 1, · · · , t − 1 at random in the shared trapdoor space and then gives them to A. • Game 3 : The game is identical to Game 2 , except that the challenger runs (ek, mtd) ← Samp loss (1 λ ) instead of running (ek, mtd) ← Samp inj (1 λ ).
• Game 4 : The game is identical to Game 3 , except that the challenger runs the sharing algorithm to generate t − 1 shared trapdoor td ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 and gives the t − 1 shared trapdoors to A.
The adversary's view is perfectly indistinguishable in Game 1 and Game 2 with the replacement of the shared trapdoors, since the sharing algorithm has the perfect privacy. Similarly, the adversary's view is perfectly indistinguishable in Game 3 and Game 4 . The only difference between Game 2 and Game 3 is the sampling algorithm. So the adversary's view is computationally indistinguishable in Game 2 and Game 3 , the fact follows that the injective and lossy modes of LTDF are indistinguishable [22] . Therefore, the adversary's view is computationally indistinguishable in Game 1 and Game 4 and the TLTDF described above is hard to distinguish injective from lossy.
Theorem 4. Let TLTDF = (Samp inj , Samp loss Share, F, F −1 , CombineF −1 , Combine) give a collection of (t, n, l, k)-TLTDFs with k = ω(log λ). Then TTDF = (Samp inj , Share, F, F −1 , CombineF −1 , Combine) give a collection of (t, n)-TTDFs.
Proof. By definition, for any id
, y) and identity id it , we have δ it = F −1 (td it , y) = CombineF −1 (x, y, δ i1 , · · · , δ it−1 , id it ), and for any t shared trapdoors td i1 , · · · , td it , we have x = Combine(F −1 (td i1 , y), · · · , F −1 (td it , y), y). Therefore, the correctness condition holds. We prove that the function also holds the threshold one-wayness:
Suppose A is a PPT inverter, if A can break the threshold one-wayness with non-negligible probability, we can build an adaptive distinguisher D between injective modes and lossy ones. D is given a function index ek as input. Its goal is to distinguish ek is generated in the injective or lossy mode. D works as follows:
1. D runs inverter A on input the function index ek and gets identities output by A. 2. D chooses these identities to corrupt and obtains associated trapdoors, then D chooses x ← {0, 1} l , computes y = F(ek, x), gives the value y and the associated trapdoors to A, and then obtains the value x ′ output by A.
if x
′ = x, D returns "1" to denote ek is generated in the injective mode, otherwise returns "0" to denote ek is generated in the lossy mode.
First, by the assumption on A, if ek is generated by Samp inj (1 λ ), we have x ′ = x with non-negligible probability and D outputs "1". Suppose ek is generated by Samp loss (1 λ ). The probability that even an unbounded algorithm A predicts x is given by the average min-entropy of x conditioned on (ek, td i1 , · · · , td it−1 , F(ek, ·)), Because F(ek, ·) takes at most 2 l−k values, ek and x are independent. By ( [22] , Lemma 2.1)
where by the perfect privacy of the sharing algorithm, td ij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 look like random numbers. Since k = ω(log λ), the probability that A outputs x and D outputs "0" is negl(λ). D distinguishes injective mode from lossy mode, a contradiction of the hypothesis.
Remarks. In our applications of TPKE and RPKE, we use the pairwise independent hash function [30] as a hardcore function. Let H : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l ′ be a family of pairwise independent hash functions, where l ′ ≤ k − 2 lg(1/ǫ) for some negligible ǫ = negl(λ), and we choose hc ← H. Following the Theorem 4, H ∞ (x|ek, td i1 , · · · , td it−1 , F(ek, x)) ≥ k. By the hypothesis that l ′ ≤ k − 2 lg(1/ǫ) and Lemma 2 , we have that hc(x) is ǫ-close to uniform.
Instantiations of TLTDF
In this section, we give instantiations of TLTDF based on the DDH assumption and the LWE assumption.
Instantiation of TLTDF Based on the DDH Assumption
By using the ElGamal-like encryption primitive in [22] , we generate a ciphertext C 1 by encrypting the identity matrix I in the injective mode and generate a ciphertext C 0 by encrypting the all-zeros matrix 0 in the lossy mode. Construction. We now describe a DDH-based TLTDF as follows. The identity space is given by Z p \{0}.
• Samp inj : On input 1 λ , it chooses (p, G, g) ← Gen(1 λ ), samples r i , s i , b ij ← Z p , i = 1, · · · , l, j = 1, · · · , t − 1 and computes
The function index is ek = C 1 and the master trapdoor is mtd = ((s i ), D = (b ij )).
• Samp loss : On input 1
The function index is ek = C 0 and the master trapdoor is mtd = ((s i ), D = (b ij )).
• Share: On input the master trapdoor mtd and any identity id i , i = 1, · · · , n, it sets 
and outputs td
• F −1 : On input any shared trapdoor td i and the value y 1 . It outputs δ
).
are the Lagrangian coefficients which may be efficiently computed given (id i0 = 0, id i1 , · · · , id it−1 ), it computes y = F(ek, x), and y
and outputs δ it .
• Combine: On input any t inversion shares δ ij , j = 1, · · · , t and the value y. Because of . . .
and outputs x = (x 1 , · · · , x l ), where
Lemma 5. The algorithms give a collection of (t, n, l, l − lg p)-TLTDFs under the DDH assumption.
Proof. The (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme holds the perfect privacy. Both modes of LTDF are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, we can show the indistinguishability between injective and lossy mode of TLTDF.
We transform the inversion algorithm into threshold version which does not change the lossy mode. In the lossy mode, the number of possible function outputs is at most p, the residual leakage r ≤ lg p, and the lossiness is k = n − r ≥ l − lg p.
Instantiation of TLTDF Based on the LWE Assumption
We recall a variant of LWE-based symmetric key cryptosystem [22] which has a small message space. Let T = R/Z, η ∈ N. For every message m ∈ Z p , we define the "offset" c m = m/p ∈ T. The secret key is For a ciphertext c = (a, c  ′ ) , the decryption algorithm computes t = η(c ′ − a, z )/q and outputs m ∈ Z p , such that t − ηc m is closest to 0. Note that for any ciphertext, as long as the absolute total error |ηe + ηu| ≤ ηq/2p, the decryption is correct.
We use "matrix encryption" mechanism in [22] to generate the ciphertext
is a message matrix, U = (u i,j ) is a matrix of rounding errors, E = (e i,j ) ∈ Z h×w q is error matrix,
In the injective mode, the message matrix M is a matrix B, which is the tensor product I ⊗ b, where I ∈ Z w×w p is the identity and
In the lossy mode, the message matrix M is all-zeros matrix 0.
Lemma 6. ([22], Lemma 6.2).
For h, w = poly(d), the matrix encryption scheme produces indistinguishable ciphertexts under the assumption that LWE q,χ is hard.
Construction. We describe a LWE-based TLTDF as follows. By using the technique of clearing out the denominator to bound the quantity of errors, we require that the identity space ID = [n], n ∈ N and set η = (n!) 3 .
• Samp inj : On input 1 d , it generates
and outputs the function index C and the master trapdoor mtd = (z i , D i ), where
• Share: On input the master trapdoor mtd and any identity id
. . .
and outputs
• F: On input the function index C and x ∈ {0, 1} h , it outputs the vector a= xA and y = xC.
• F −1 : On input any shared trapdoor td iv and a = xA, it outputs the inversion share
are Lagrangian coefficients which may be efficiently computed given i 0 = 0, i 1 , · · · , i t−1 , it computes the image y = (y 1 , · · · , y w ) of x and xB = (m 1 , · · · , m w ). For every i = 1, · · · , w, δ
• Combine: On input any t inversion shares δ i1 , · · · , δ it . Because of f (i)
are Lagrangian coefficients which can be efficiently computed given any t identities i 1 , · · · , i t , it computes
iv , We show correctness and lossy properties of our TLTDF as follows.
We recall some probability distributions in [22] . For α ∈ R + , let Ψ α be a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation
on T. For any probability φ : T → R + and q ∈ Z + , let its discretization φ : Z q → R + be the discrete distribution over Z q of the random variable ⌊q · X φ ⌉ mod q, where X φ is the distribution φ.
is the Lagrangian coefficient and let E = (e i,j ) ∈ Z h×w q be an error matrix generated by choosing independent error terms e i,j ← χ =Ψ α and e iv ← χ =Ψ α , v ∈ [t]. Every entry of xE + t v=1 ηL v e iv has absolute value less than q/4p for all x ∈ {0, 1} h , except with probability at most w · 2 −g over the choice of E and e iv , Proof. By definition, e i = ⌊qs i ⌉ mod q, e iv = ⌊qs iv ⌉ mod q where s i , s iv are independent normal variables with mean 0 and variance
ηL v e iv , where e = (e 1 , · · · , e h ) T . Then s ′ is at most (h + γ)/2 ≤ q/8p away from q(( x, s + t v=1 ηL v s iv ) mod 1).
Since the s i , s iv are independent, x, s + t v=1 ηL v s iv is distributed as a normal variable with mean 0 and variance at most
Then by the tail inequality on normal variables and the hypothesis on α,
We show that for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1} h , Pr[|s
. Taking a union bound over all x ∈ {0, 1} h , we can conclude that |s ′ | < q/4p for all x ∈ {0, 1} h except with probability at most 2 −g . Therefore, for each column e of E and e iv , v ∈ [t], |s ′ | < q/4p, for all x except with probability at most 2 −g over the choice of e and e iv , v ∈ [t]. The lemma follows by a union bound over all w columns of E.
Parameters. Instantiate the parameters: let
, the size of the function index is hd log
Correctness. We now show correctness of the above TLTDF by proving the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The TLTDF with above parameters instantiated satisfies the correctness.
Proof. The combining algorithm computes y ′ = (y 
iv .
We have
Let g = h ≥ γ 2 in above Lemma 7, the absolute total error
Therefore, we have
the inversion is correct.
Theorem 6. The TLTDF with above parameters produces indistinguishable function indexes under the LW E q,χ assumption. Moreover, the algorithms give a collection of (t, n, h, k)-TLTDFs under the LW E q,χ assumption is hard. The residual leakage
Proof. The (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme holds the perfect privacy and the injective and lossy modes of LTDF are indistinguishable [22] . Therefore, we can show the indistinguishability between injective and lossy mode of TLTDF. We transform the inversion algorithm into threshold version which does not change the lossy mode. In the lossy mode, as in the correctness argument, |(xU 
Threshold Trapdoor Relation
We show a relaxation of TTDF called TTDR and prove that TTDR maintains the same application of TPKE and RPKE. Definition 3. A collection of (t, n)-TTDRs is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms as follows:
• Gen(1 λ ) → (ek, mtd): On input the security parameter 1 λ , the generation algorithm outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Samp(ek) → (x, y): On input the function index ek, the relation sampling algorithm samples a relation (x, y = F(ek, x)).
• F −1 (td i , y) → δ i : On input any shared trapdoor td i and the value y, the partial inversion algorithm outputs the inversion share δ i .
On input x ∈ {0, 1} l , its image y = F(ek, x), any t − 1 inversion shares δ i1 , · · · , δ it−1 , and identity id it , the combining inversion algorithm outputs the inversion share δ it of identity id it .
Note that the generation algorithm and the relation sampling algorithm are probabilistic algorithms, while the rest four algorithms are deterministic algorithms, and we require that in the partial inversion algorithm, the combining inversion algorithm and the combining algorithm, the behavior of the algorithms is unspecified, if the y is not in the image.
, any relation (x, y = F(ek, x)), we require that for any t shared trapdoors td i1 , · · · , td it , we have
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary and define its advantage function as
A (t, n)-TTDR is threshold one-way if for any PPT adversary the advantage function is negligible. Following the construction of TPKE and RPKE from TTDF, we can show generic constructions of TPKE and RPKE from TTDR by running the relation sampling algorithm of TTDR instead of the evaluation algorithm of TTDF in the encryption algorithm. The threshold one-wayness ensures the TPKE and RPKE are IND-CPA secure.
Threshold Lossy Trapdoor Relation. Following the definitions of TTDR and TLTDF, by relaxing the evaluation algorithm of TLTDF into relation sampling algorithm, we present the definition of TLTDR and show that TLTDR also produces indistinguishable function indexes. Similarly, we can prove TLTDR implies TTDR.
We propose a refined definition of the relation by omitting the public computable injective map in LTDR [27] . Informally, the function index ek is a composite function description which consists of the inverse map of the public computable injective map. The relation sampling algorithm outputs a relation (x, y = F(ek, x)). The inversion algorithm takes in the trapdoor and the image y = F(ek, x), outputs x.
Instantiations of TLTDR. Following the instantiation of TLTDF under the DDH assumption and the instantiation of LTDR [27] , we give an efficient instantiation under the DDH assumption by relaxing evaluation algorithm into relation sampling algorithm. We constructs the TLTDR by using 2 × 3 matrix encryption. The function indexes in the injective mode and in the lossy mode of TLTDR are
For C = (c ij ) 2×3 and (x 1 , x 2 ) ← Z 2 p , the relation sampling algorithm outputs a relation (x = (g x1 , g x2 ), F(ek, x) =(c F(ek, x) . It is not hard to show a collection of (t, n, 2 log p, log p)-TLTDRs under the DDH assumption.
9 Performance Evaluations denote the cost of a matrix-vector product, a secret sharing, a one-time signature, a tag-based encryption, inverting an image of LTDF, sampling a preimage of preimage sampleable function and a modular exponentiation respectively. We construct the scheme of Ours1 and Ours2 from TTDF where l denotes input length of function and the scheme of Ours3 from TTDR. and computational costs of our lattice-based TPKE schemes with that in [13] , [15] , [16] . For latticebased TPKE, the communication cost of our scheme is less than [13] , in which they need to use a large modulus which causes larger ciphertexts. Compared with [15] , they split the message into many pieces and encrypt every piece by a different tag-based encryption, that cause the size of the public key and the ciphertext is at least linear in the number of users, while our scheme splits the master secret key directly and shows the size of the public key and the ciphertext is independent of the number of users. What's more, the computational cost of our TPKE is also less than [13] , [15] , [16] , especially during the encryption and decryption phase, our TPKE scheme only requires to compute a simple matrix-vector product respectively. However, in [13] , the decryption algorithm requires every user computes a sharing by a pseudorandom secret sharing and a matrix-vector product. In [15] , the encryption algorithm needs to run a secret sharing scheme to split a message into n pieces, n times tag-based encryption to encrypt every piece and a one-time signature. Moreover, the decryption algorithm require to check the signature and invert an image of lossy trapdoor function to obtain a decryption share. Compared with [16] , their encryption algorithm requires every user runs a one-time signature and compute twice matrix-vector product, and the decryption algorithm needs to sample a preimage of preimage sampleable function. Table 2 compares the communication costs of our RPKE schemes with that in [19] , [20] , [9] . The size of the public key of our DDH-based RPKE is a 2 × 3 matrix which is less than [20] and [9] in which the size of the public key is at least linear with the revocation threshold value. of lattice d = 512, 768, 1024 respectively. In LWE-based TPKE scheme, the average running times of the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm are 0.076s, 0.167s, 0.293s, and 0.005s, 0.012s, 0.021s. In LWE-based RPKE scheme, the average running times of the encryption algorithm are 0.092s, 0.209s, 0.382s. From these outcomes, we note that the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm of our TPKE schemes and the encryption algorithm of our RPKE schemes are efficient.
